Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 3.1 Introduction So you need a paragraph at

Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

3.1 Introduction

So you need a paragraph at the very beginning that sets out what this chapter does, its structure, and the core themes to be discussed.

State identity is linked to the attitude of officials who often occupy positions of state power. This is said to be a restricted understanding of the national identity, but in strategic affairs, it could be said that these viewpoints matter. It is mentioned that after the end of World War II, the state was considered to be the major player when it came to the development of security that focused on ensuring the welfare of its people by providing the right strategy and provision in law, education, economy, social service, and infrastructure. This has meant that the state has become increasingly critical and plays a significant role in the lives of its citizens. The country’s national security is often considered a multi-factor and dynamic condition of a nation, which is usually found to be integrated in dealing with interference, obstacles, threats and challenges. In short, it can be said that the world war led to the creation of a modern state whose core responsibilities were seen mostly focused on creating a positive environment and protecting the overall well-being of its citizens.

There is growing importance given to the dynamic nature of the threats and the protection becoming more complex. Crises can take multiple forms, and their overall transformative consequences are often beyond the immediate scope. In addition, globalisation has also had a significant influence on threats and national security policy, which is critical in the modern world. One popular example is the 9/11 attacks, which had a substantial impact on global geopolitics, and the challenges associated with it are still felt. While the role played by big, powerful states like Russia, the US, and China differs from the small players like the UAE and Qatar, the changing threat perception has also pushed these countries to explore their measures and adopt measures or strategies that would help improve their resilience.

Regional security is a collective effort involving different levels of collaboration between the resident state players. Buzan and Waever (2003) developed the regional security complex theory (RSCT), which argued that the regional substructure is critical in understanding the wider construct of international security. More critically, they claimed that due to the proximity of the regional players and their complex relations and interactions, the security relationships builds on a compound system of amity and enmity driven by the actions and policies of the members of the complex and their perceptions. Therefore, regional alliances are more dynamic and fungible than international security systems based on power distribution. However, Buzan and Waever (2003) identified that the regional security systems are held together by the fear of states that their neighbours will collaborate with other actors to their detriment. As a result, they strive to cooperate despite any differences.

Countries in the ME are working towards the creation of regional security complexes. The situation was evident in the GCC through lifting of the blockade on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in January 2021 after four years, despite Qatar’s failure to adhere to their seven-point demand. Asseburg and Henkel (2021) identified that Qatar was increasingly leaning towards Iran and Turkey to their detriment and was also increasingly seeking other partners in the region to the detriment of the four. They gave in to the stand-off for the greater good. Therefore, it is evident that regional alignment is more dynamic in response to various issues of interest to different parties, but it is stronger due to the proximity and shared interests, which then mandates cooperation.

To better understand how different factors impact foreign policy and resilience, one must first understand their influence, especially in relation to the the UAE. This chapter aims to explore this aspect and the framework of regional security complexes and how it had contributed towards traditional security, which would help in understanding strict and distinct patterns of interaction between the different actors and help explore strategies adopted since the Second World War. It would allow us to better understand the country’s position in the overall global power system and help us understand the type of role that the country plays according to it. In addition to this, as mentioned, the national identity significantly influences foreign policy, resilience and, thus, national security. We have seen in the previous chapter the shift in foreign policy and the different rulers’ different perspectives and views of foreign policy and their own position or role in the region. This has significant influences, and it is critical to understand how these different perspectives or national identities can influence the country’s resilience.

Therefore, the chapter explores three main factors related to the UAE, which include the small state or small power impact on the national identity, the hedging or bandwagoning strategy which is adopted by the country and how it has changed over time, and last but not least, the role of the formal and informal alliances. The chapter also provides a comprehensive overview of resilience and national diversity, which would help show the limitations of the current strategies and help improve for the future, leading us to answer the main question of this thesis on what makes alliances resilient.

3.2 Regional Security Complex

The literature on the historical progression of regional security complexes (RSCs) includes three specific phases: (a) The modern era spanning from 1500 to 1945, (b) the Cold War era and decolonisation from 1945 to 1989, (c) and the post-Cold War era starting from 1990. The narrative highlights the rapid progression of history and the shift from traditional security dynamics to the prevalence of European-style sovereign states worldwide, establishing the fundamental structure for the rise of RSCs. From 1500 to 1945, the European international system experienced a global expansion as European nations exerted economic, political, and military dominance worldwide. Nevertheless, this process of imperial expansion frequently resulted in the subjugation of native populations and the establishment of European dominions in other lands. The regional security dynamics were primarily shaped by global competition among European countries rather than local security interdependence.

The second phase (1945-1989) was characterised by the Cold War and the process of decolonisation, which resulted in conflicting outcomes. The process of decolonisation resulted in the formation of multiple new nations, especially in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, which in turn influenced the security dynamics inside these just liberated entities. Nevertheless, the bipolar competition between the US and the Soviet Union dominated much of Europe and Northeast Asia, and both superpowers intervened extensively in the recently liberated areas.

Decolonisation throughout Asia, Africa, and the ME entailed the replacement of imperial systems with independent nation-states, recognising their equal sovereignty and the official acknowledgement of universal human rights. Despite its difficulties, this revolution successfully finalised the restructuring of the worldwide political system into the European model of independent territorial nation states. During the Cold War, decolonisation was characterised by an uneven power distribution, resulting in RSCs emerging based on interstate competition and conflict. The historical account emphasises the intricate interaction between global and regional forces in influencing the development of RSCs.

It is said that there is a need to move beyond the simplistic view of the international system, which is considered a uniform set of Westphalian-type states. The literature emphasises that within the state level, significant variables, like historical roles, colonial history, and the state’s power, influence the security dynamics. Those three factors are critical in understanding the differences in security dynamics. The conventional approach to delineating the global military-political landscape traditionally centred on identifying great powers and interpreting their interactions as the primary factors defining the global level. This framework was especially prevalent during the Cold War, characterised by bipolarity, where superpowers played a pivotal role. However, the collapse of the USSR marked a paradigm shift, leading to the end of bipolarity and raising questions about the post-Cold War global order.

The theoretical apparatus developed during the Cold War, considering the number of great powers as indicative of system-level polarity, faced challenges in the post-Cold War era. The presence of significant powers, ranging from the US to regional players like Israel, Iran, Brazil, and others, introduced nuances that defied easy classification. Scholars engaged in debates, exploring concepts like unipolarity, multipolarity, and various hybrid models to make sense of the evolving international system. After the USSR’s dissolution, the criteria for achieving superpower status emerged as demanding, requiring extensive capabilities, global military and political reach, and active participation in securitisation processes across diverse regions. The US emerged as the preeminent superpower, while other major powers like China, the European Union, Japan, and Russia were considered potential challengers.

Figure 2: A sample regional security complex theory for the US and Iran

Great powers, occupying a tier below superpowers, were characterised by a slightly lower threshold of capabilities and behaviour. The key distinguishing factor for great powers was being responded to by others based on system-level calculations, signifying the potential to vie for superpower status. Historical examples of great powers during the nineteenth century included Germany, the US, and Japan. Regional powers constituted the bottom tier, defining the polarity of specific RSCs without exerting substantial influence at the global level. Although their capabilities played a crucial role in regional dynamics, they were excluded from higher-level calculations of system polarity. The three-tiered scheme, encompassing superpowers, great powers, and regional powers, introduces complexity to polarity theory. However, it clearly distinguishes between global and regional powers, facilitating a more nuanced understanding of the contemporary international system.

The theory of RSCs, introduced by Buzan in 1993 and further developed by Buzan and Waever, provides a conceptual framework for understanding the post-Cold War international security order. Buzan and Wæver expanded the t

raditional approach to security, which focused solely on political and military dimensions, by introducing a multidimensional perspective encompassing political, military, economic, social, and environmental aspects. This framework aims to overcome the limitations of narrow national security perspectives and overly broad global views, asserting that regional dynamics play a central role in shaping international security. The RSC theory (RSCT) positions the regional level as the key arena for security analyses, bridging the gap between national and global security considerations. It emphasises that states are primary actors responsible for shaping regions engaging in processes of securitisation and de-securitisation. This perspective helps avoid overemphasising global powers, redirecting attention to local factors that form the foundation of regional orders and balance of power.

Crucially, a regional security complex is not synonymous with a geographical region but is a socially constructed analytical tool that evolves based on international actors’ security interactions. While geography, particularly proximity, forms the basis, the boundaries of an RSC may not align precisely with conventional geopolitical regions. An RSC is defined as a set of units where securitisation, de-securitisation, or both processes are so intertwined that analysing or resolving security problems independently becomes impractical. The configuration of an RSC can change in three ways: maintaining the status quo, undergoing internal transformation, or experiencing external transformation. An intriguing aspect is the potential for overlap, occurring when global powers directly enter a regional complex, influencing or suppressing existing dynamics.

Initially centred on political and military dimensions, the RSCT expanded to include non-state actors and consider economic, social, and environmental sectors. These sectors serve as tools to highlight specific types of relationships and interactions within the complex, enabling the identification of relevant actors and developmental tendencies of threats in each sector. Amitav Acharya and other critics contend that the theory neglects the influence of regional institutions on security complexes and does not adequately consider the interplay between different regions. In addition, Safal Ghimire offers a critique of the absence of well-defined standards for establishing RSCs and the theory’s narrow emphasis on providing descriptive accounts of regional powers rather than forecasting their strategic interdependence. Ghimire also emphasises the exclusion of worldwide concerns such as the spread of weaponry, safeguarding against cyber-attacks, ensuring aviation safety, and addressing climate-related security challenges.

Najmiyeh P. Esmaeili and colleagues express concerns over the challenge of identifying the most significant regional variable. To tackle this issue, they suggest incorporating a fifth variable called the problem. Tomasz Pawłuszko challenges the limited understanding of the anarchic variable and critiques the concentration on the state as the central focus, highlighting the significance of non-state players in the current security dynamics. Petr Zelinka argues that the RSC concept does not sufficiently take into account non-state players. Meanwhile, Jarosław Jarząbek emphasises the increasing importance of non-state entities, such as multinational businesses, in shaping regional security. Furthermore, Jarząbek highlights that the growing influence of non-state actors undermines the fundamental principles of the RSCT, particularly in relation to the significance of geographical proximity as a decisive element. Contemporary challenges such as cyberattacks and long-range military weapons weaken the conventional focus on geographical proximity in shaping RSCs.

The concept is defined by the interconnected processes of securitisation and de-securitisation, which highlight the mutual dependency on security among the governments concerned. Nevertheless, formulating the RSC concept prompts inquiries regarding the applicability of security interdependence across all geographical regions facing linked security challenges. The current study introduces the nascent RSC (n-RSC) framework, which incorporates three crucial variables: the proximity of significant power, the impact of security on external factors, and the influence of local states. The objective is to examine its development and transformation by exploring situations where security interdependence may not normally arise.

The n-RSC framework argues that the lack of security interdependence can result in two outcomes: an overlay, where the presence of a major power disrupts local security interactions, or an unstructured security region, where states are unable to form security relations due to capacity limitations or geographical obstacles. The framework defines the concept of n-RSC as a group of states that are geographically close to each other and face interconnected security issues but lack significant security cooperation. This situation may necessitate the intervention of external powers. According to Buzan and Wæver, great powers naturally tend to extend their influence into the territories next to them. The n-RSC paradigm posits that during the early phases, the participation of a neighbouring major power becomes essential in safeguarding borders against security externalities and maintaining regional stability. This is especially significant when there is a lack of security interdependence among local states.

The analysis suggests that neighbouring major powers are more likely to respond promptly to security risks arising from uncontrolled security zones. In the early stages of an RSC, being close to other powerful countries is seen as very important. These neighbouring countries may perceive threats to their national security and respond by starting projects to regionalise and organise nearby states. This can be seen clearly with the UAE, which aligned with Saudi Arabia and the US at the time, which are greater powers or strong regional players. The framework recognises the significance of neighbouring major powers as hybrid players who play dual roles as external and internal actors throughout the early stages of developing a region. The statement questions the notion of exclusive memberships in the RSC, proposing that powerful countries can have overlapping memberships in the RSC, primarily when they are located near a specific region.

In addition, the n-RSC paradigm acknowledges the autonomy of local states in pursuing their objectives, strategically leveraging external powers, and participating in many regional groupings simultaneously. A study highlights that the participation of neighbouring major powers enhances legitimacy and can stimulate the process of regional integration, even if local states collaborate with other external actors simultaneously. Regarding polarity, the n-RSC framework proposes that local units do not have a pole. Still, the neighbouring great power takes on a pole position, including regional leadership, custodianship, and protection.

The proposed n-RSC framework introduces a nuanced perspective on the evolution of regional security dynamics, offering potential scenarios for developing security complexes over time. This framework challenges conventional notions put forth by scholars like Buzan and Waever. It outlines several possibilities for the evolution of nascent regions based on the interactions between local states and external actors. In the initial stages, the n-RSC framework suggests that a hybrid actor, becoming security-independent with local states, can initiate regional projects. These projects may improve security interactions among the local states and external great powers, fostering asymmetrical relations marked by reciprocal commitments. This dynamic may give rise to durable patterns of amity and enmity, ultimately forming a fully-fledged RSC centred around the hybrid actor.

Figure 3: nRSC Framework

Another scenario proposed by the framework involves the continued act of threat construction by adjacent great powers. In this case, the securitising actors may identify other regional issues as threats or emphasise the severity of existing threats to maintain growing cooperation and security interdependence between local states and the great powers. This ongoing threat construction serves to perpetuate the region-building processes. The n-RSC framework also acknowledges the potential for local states to develop security region qualities through interactions and cooperation facilitated by an adjacent great power. Depending on their capabilities, these interactions could result in durable patterns of enmity and amity. Notably, the hybrid actor may transition from being an internal member to an external actor, and local states may no longer require its presence.

Furthermore, the framework considers the possibility of great powers shaping the evolving region to foster durable patterns of amity rather than enmity among regional states. This cooperative approach may lead to the development of a security community. The framework also contemplates cases where the adjacent geographic area may be absorbed into an existing RSC, forming a subcomplex within the larger regional structure. However, the framework acknowledges challenges, particularly in scenarios involving multiple adjacent great powers. Cooling relations between these powers could hinder the formation of nascent RSC structures. Local states may adopt a nonaligned hedge strategy or align with the power, offering convincing incentives and influencing the trajectory of the region-building process. In short, the n-RSC framework enriches the discourse on regional security by providing a more dynamic and flexible perspective on the evolution of security complexes. It offers valuable insights for understanding the complex interplay of actors – state and non-state – in the formation and development of regional security dynamics.

For example, Dubai’s foreign policy has evolved in accordance with the subtle dynamics suggested by the n-RSC framework, which offers a perspective to understand the changing role of the city-state in international interactions. Dubai initially formed an RSC and strategically collaborated with significant economic players. This exemplifies the first scenario in which a hybrid actor develops unequal relationships with local governments. The city’s interactions, taking into account power imbalances and acknowledging larger leadership roles, played a role in the formation of long-lasting patterns of friendship and hostility within the region. Dubai’s foreign policy direction aligns with the second n-RSC scenario, in which actors involved in security matters persistently portray issues as dangers in order to maintain collaboration. Due to its role as a major economic centre, Dubai encounters global difficulties that require continuous efforts to establish security interdependence with key economic allies.

In addition, Dubai’s endeavours to establish itself as a reliable business centre align with the third and fourth options of the n-RSC framework, promoting the characteristics of regional security and the possible evolution into a security community. The interactions of the city-state contribute to the development of qualities associated with security communities, wherein regional actors collaborate towards common security objectives. The recognition within the framework of the possibility of withdrawing or reducing its presence aligns with Dubai’s evolving involvement in specific regional arrangements as its capabilities and interests become more diverse. The deterioration of relations between neighbouring major powers could impact Dubai’s foreign policy decisions, leading local nations to either pursue nonaligned hedge measures or align themselves with the one that provides the most compelling incentives. Overall, the n-RSC framework offers significant insights into the intricate interactions between various players and circumstances that influence Dubai’s foreign policy. It explains how the city-state’s strategic priorities change within the larger regional security context.

In short, it can be said that the RSC provides a comprehensive framework that recognises the multidimensionality of security, emphasises regional dynamics, and incorporates diverse actors and sectors, contributing to a nuanced understanding of the evolving international security landscape. In using the said theory, it is critical to understand the role of different powers, national role conception, hedging/bandwagoning, alliances, and soft and hard power to critically analyse the evolution of foreign policy. To this, can be added the idea of national role conception that shapes elite understanding of how best to meet regional security challenges.

3.3 National Role Conception

An ever-growing corpus of research investigates how elites see their domestic and foreign operational settings; one method that has proven effective is using ideas of national roles to understand the actions of foreign policymakers. National role conceptions, which have their origins in role theory in social psychology, signify an all-encompassing pattern of conduct and attitude that state actors use to deal with repetitive circumstances. According to Kalevi Holsti, a trailblazing thinker in the field of international relations, national role conceptions are the ways in which policymakers understand the proper choices, obligations, regulations, and acts for their state within the global system, which in turn shape the perception and functioning of their nation in connection to the outside world. These ideas provide guidance for lawmakers to help them shape the standards and conventions that the government follows while responding to different situations.

Jacques Hymans argues that this method goes beyond simply considering national identity as a social phenomenon and instead requires looking at how leaders see it. To sum up, national role conceptions are the rules and standards that govern government reactions and actions; they are based on policymakers’ understandings of their nation’s position in the international arena. While it is true that the worldviews of those in positions of power influence the actions of foreign policymakers, it is equally important to stress that this view does not ignore the influence of other objective internal and external factors. According to Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, national role conceptions play a crucial role as a framework that facilitates the interaction between structural forces and the individuals or groups engaged. The many situational elements that influence policymakers’ personal impressions of their nation in the global arena are shaped by their exposure to both home and international surroundings.

In this setting, the national conception role theory highlights the complex relationship between the actors’ self-defined interests and objectives and the exogenous variables that place demands on them. Hyman’s (2006) report does not get into how policymakers think about the national function, but previous research has shown that socialisation has a significant impact on popular ideas about the role and that different leaders tend to have very consistent views of this. It is safe to say that foreign policy players in pluralist countries, where people have other ideas about who they are, use this diversity to form their own subjective views of their country’s place in the global system. Research also mentions that the precedence on why or how a particular conception is given more importance largely depends on the result of the domestic power struggles that arise between the actors with different notions regarding the country and its role. When a new power or individual comes to power, the foreign policy discourse is said to be revamped to match the conception and ideas of the new individual. In addition to this, if there is an external stimulus like significant changes within the international system, then certain role conceptions would gain more salience or find more support from the community or people.

Figure 4:Role Theory and the Source of Human Behaviour

Using role theory as a prism, the literature delves into the complex web of cultural and foreign policy ties, exploring the many facets of roles, such as responsibilities, impacts, expected actions, policy choices, and rankings. With its foundation in Holsti’s examination of 71 governments and 972 sources’ utterances, including speeches and official statements, the framework continues to have a considerable impact on role theory-centred research, even if role theory has many offshoots. There are two aggressive roles and four accommodationist roles identified by Holsti’s framework, which has had a lasting influence. China’s defensive position towards world free trade, the post-World War II order, and UN judgements demonstrate the Defender of the Faith function, which entails protecting value systems. Another role often seen to be adopted by the bigger powers is acting as the mediator-integrator. One example of this can be seen with China trying to mediate a truce between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. Another role that is often undertaken by the powers in a region is to be the subsystem collaborator, which would indicate that the state makes many commitments that could be far-reaching with an effort to improve their commitment and improve cooperation with other countries and an example of this is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Several elements, both at the domestic and foreign levels, impact the roles and the formation of ideas about national roles. Cultural values, conventions, and the established identity of a nation provide the basis for foreign policymakers’ perceptions of national roles. A national role paradigm that is in line with the larger domestic social discourse is subsequently formed by translating these influences. It is important to remember that people don’t always agree on national duties; disputes can emerge between elites and the public as well as among elites. Individual decisions are just the tip of the iceberg regarding the cultural and social factors that shape national identities through the internal constructions of roles. As a representation of the social collectivity of the state and nation, national role conceptions capture the desires and actions of the nation and reflect its beliefs, aspirations, and ideals. Unless there is a revolutionary upheaval, national role ideas, which are shared, historically and socially created, tend to stay stable across administration changes. Harnisch argues that the pervasive impact of national role ideas is demonstrated by the stability and continuity of German foreign policy culture post-Cold War. Yet, even within these frameworks, priorities can change in response to things like public opinion, foreign players, and governmental majorities. As foreign policy elites play a ‘two-level’ game, juggling domestic and international politics at the same time, Maull characterises national role conceptions as general, interpretable rules for decision-makers. Concepts of national roles can shift slowly yet remain inherently stable. A prime example of how ideas can change over time is that the idea of Germany as a civilian power encountered resistance in the 1990s due to the possibility of military engagement elsewhere.

Policymakers’ views of the state’s capacities and possibilities in the international system are among the structural and material elements that influence national role conceptions and ideational variables. In the context of their state’s external environment, these notions reflect the judgements, commitments, regulations, and actions that policymakers envision as appropriate. They provide analyses of the global scene informed by the psycho-milieu, a concept proposed by Harold and Margaret Sprout. Conflicts between these understandings and the real operational context might influence foreign policy results. A structural component is added to the role theory by external forces, such as the international system’s role prescriptions. These recommendations connect structural variables like international norms with the agency, which would be the national role conception influenced by the global actors. A notable contribution of the role theory to foreign policy analysis is this synthesis of structure and agency. Although ‘role’ is more commonly used by identity constructivists in the field of international relations, role theory connects constructivist theory with analysis of foreign policy. This would explore dimensions that go beyond the study’s requirements; hence, we do not further elaborate on this and focus on the factors influencing it.

One factor that is said to have a critical influence based on the above is the power and perception of the state’s power, which is also influenced by the alliance it holds, which in turn impacts the country’s hedging or bandwagoning expectations or choices. We aim to explore how these factors influence the conception of national roles in the following sub-sections.

3.3.1 Small State or Small Powers

Various terminologies are used to define the hierarchy of states, but research discussions in international relations and related subjects revolve around the issue of national power. Researchers and politicians have used adjectives like ‘minor powers’, ‘weak states’, and others to describe less powerful governments, whereas words like ‘powers’, ‘major powers’, and ‘great powers’ are used interchangeably to describe powerful states. This variance of terminology mirrored the subjective and conventional character of the idea of national authority. Absolute power is defined as national power that would be the essential national attribute of a country and is based on quantitative characteristics such as area, population, and economic strength, which are all critical in separating the countries based on their might. The article argues that absolute definitions are poor analytical tools for analysing power dynamics among states and criticises them for their shortcomings.

One example of how difficult it is to create unambiguous differences using quantitative criteria is the Commonwealth’s definition of a ‘small state’ as having a population of less than 1.5 million. Drawing on Baehr’s discovery that defining ‘small states’ presents substantial obstacles, the discussion highlights the difficulty in employing power-as-attribute approaches. Baehr highlights the difficulty of deciding how to categorise states and the concomitant difficulty of defining ‘small’ and ‘large’ states. The book argues that distinctions based on such criteria are frequently arbitrary and difficult to understand. This highlights that one of the major obstacles is the lack of definition, which provides clear quantitative criteria that would make a state transition from objects to states when it comes to international politics. Two competing frameworks for defining national power—power-as-attribute and power-as-relation—are discussed in the literature. The idea of national power is seen as something that can change depending on how nations are compared within the power-as-relation framework rather than a fixed concept. We use the phrases ‘small states’ and ‘great powers’ to describe different international roles based on these governments’ respective degrees of power.

According to the research, there are mainly three kinds of relative definitions. To highlight their diplomatic weakness and peripheral position in international politics, ‘small states’ are defined by Vandenbosch as entities that cannot fight strong powers on an equal footing. Expanding on this, Vital stresses the fragility of tiny states, drawing attention to their weakness in the face of pressure and their restricted political choices compared to superpowers. It is mentioned that these small powers would take the rule developed by bigger powers rather than try to play a role in making the rules, and this is mainly linked to their inability to protect themselves against bigger aggressors, and they would have to rely on their alliances to protect them any harm which means that small states can be considered to be consumers of national security instead of producers. One way of differentiating is the small state governments’ inability to induce other states or governments to follow their line of conduct or policy, which these countries often do not pursue.

Another definition for the small state is called ‘small power’, which states that the state is not able to obtain any security by its own capabilities and would need to rely fundamentally on the help of other states, processes or institutions to achieve it, which means that small powers and great powers are not just differing in size but in different qualitative characteristics. Handel adds to Rothstein’s methodology by arguing that international regimes and alliances are the primary determinants of the national strength of tiny states, while they draw strength from various internal resources. Despite their lowly positions, weak states are seen as clever manipulators of great powers’ competition, taking advantage of opportunities to affect the international system. In his writings, Buzan explores the subtle differences between ‘weak states’ and ‘weak powers’, and he argues that a formidable state is one that bridges the gap between its neighbours and has a strong internal identity, in contrast to a weak state that acts more as a barrier. A minor power’s size and organisational shortcomings sometimes cause it to be weak in comparison to neighbouring nations’ capabilities. This sophisticated view brings a qualitative approach, highlighting traits that cause variations in the capacity to project power.

The second relative definition considers that stronger and weaker states view threats differently and act accordingly in their foreign policy. According to Baker Fox, one of the most important ways to distinguish between ‘great powers’ and ‘small powers’ is by how well one state is able to secure or oppose the demands of other states. A major power’s influence extends across a far larger area than a small power, whose needs are more limited to their own and the nearby territories. Due to the power gap, Bjøl also points out that small states and great powers behave differently in foreign policy. Considerations of prestige motivate large countries to seek a more expansive international agenda, whereas smaller governments prioritise restricted, sometimes bilateral, national interests. One way in which unequal powers differ is in their approach to national security. Large powers place a premium on the ability to project their dominance abroad, whereas smaller states place a premium on effectively rejecting intervention from outside sources.

According to Bogaturov, states categorised as ‘leaders’ or ‘outsiders’ in the international system exhibit unique foreign policy behaviours. To increase their power and cement their position as world leaders, the individuals or people in power often act unilaterally, use initiative diplomacy and display provocative behaviour. By contrast, the people categorised as outsiders are not ambitious in foreign policy, act defensively and passively, and only obtain political clout through coalitions. One key distinction is whether they can ‘make’ or ‘take’ the norms and regulations of international governance.

The emphasis on third-type relative definitions moves to the systemic functions of larger and smaller states. At the level of systems, Modelski differentiates between ‘great powers’ and ‘small powers’ when analysing national interests. In contrast to ‘small powers’ focused on localised areas, ‘great powers’ often pursue global objectives. Modelski stresses that in order to comprehend the dynamics of regional subsystems—formed by interactions among ‘small powers’—it is essential to consider the influence of ‘great powers’ on international politics. An analogous method is presented by Young, who classifies foreign players as either ‘global’ or ‘universal’ players having an impact on a worldwide scale or ‘regional actors’ limited to their own subsystems. Domínguez, hailing from a neo-Marxist stance, divides unequal powers into three categories: ‘major powers’ that can have an impact on a global scale, ‘second-order powers’ that influence the foreign policies of big powers, and ‘peripheral countries’ that have little significance beyond their subsystems.

In this, the author claims that the second category of powers is critical for the major powers and often takes into consideration their reactions when implementing foreign policies. Still, peripheral countries do not find much importance, mainly due to these countries’ inability to exert any pressure. This is a suitable classification as we can see that the US has always had to consider its allies like the UAE when making decisions to ensure that the alliances did not sour and to ensure they have bases in these countries. From this, we could say that the UAE is a second-order power with significant influence. However, it still needs help from the greater powers to protect itself and its national security. While it could defend itself against other similar-sized countries, it would struggle against bigger powers; hence, transitioning to become a bigger power has been difficult. This is one area where more research or analysis needs to be undertaken to see how countries could take the next step to shift to great powers. Countries like the UK, which could be considered small in size but hold greater power due to its ability and influence, show the possibility of small states being able to exert the same type of influence, but there is a need to understand how to transition.

Furthermore, small states are vital to the global order since they comprise nearly two-thirds of the UN membership. They usually function in other states’ broad economic and political environments. Such states’ foreign policies chase the same goals and objectives as other states, including their people’s well-being, security, and prosperity. They conduct diplomacy using the ‘toolbox’ other larger states use. However, although all states have the same autonomy and sovereignty, specific features impact the operations of small states in the global system.

Small states often have limited material and human resources to manage their external relations compared to larger state actors. Their actions impact the global order and are also more focused. These states understand the importance of multilateral diplomacy in amplifying their interests and engagement in the international community. In this sense, complex processes and structures strain their resources. For example, they often need more resources that could help them acquire positions in international organisations. Despite their limitations, they can reduce, circumvent or turn their disadvantages into strategic advantages. However, this calls for dependence on rules of international law, collective solidarity, a focus on restricted objectives, and creative remedies.

3.3.2 Alliances: Formal and Informal

As a result of interactions among sovereign political entities driven by power dynamics, alliance formation is an inevitable consequence if the anarchic international system. States form alliances, says Stephen Walt, to balance power or to protect themselves from danger. Over the years, this idea has been further enhanced, and based on this, it is mentioned that weaker states often seek to balance out larger ones through alliances, while stronger states may seek to increase their global power share through alliances. Alliances are considered a process or a strategy in diplomacy, and can be defined as promises of military assistance between two or more sovereign states.

When taken in the strict sense, alliances are considered to be formal arrangements that are treaty-based and can be multilateral, which means they incorporate different countries that have a similar threat to counter. On the other hand, coalitions are often considered to be cooperation and coordination among different nations with the aim of addressing a common threat which is not bound by any formal agreements. The literature mentions that alliances are often born out of necessity, like growing out of coercive or conflict situations. The UAE, for instance, has been allied with the US to protect itself from regional threats like Iran, and this was a formal alliance based on agreement on acceptable constraints. Still, alliances do not always need to be formal. They can be informal as well as highly dynamic. McGowan and Rood (1975) opine that during the period between 1814 and 1914, the informal alliances were mostly just exchanges of diplomatic notes or verbal agreements made. More than fifty-five alliances were formed throughout the 19th Century period, of which 28 were considered formal while the remaining were informal.

Small states use international and regional alliances to increase their influence in international forums. The UAE has formed different partnerships throughout its existence. Some provincial associations include the Arab League, a collection of Arab nations across the MENA. The UAE has allied itself with other countries across the Gulf. It has also partnered with the US and joined the UN. One of the significant strengths of alliances is that they make cooperation with other nations easy and less costly. Also, unions are helpful in disasters such as wars as they can provide the resources and workforce a country requires to overcome such challenges. The UAE has depended on its alliances to maintain its peace and stability in the Gulf region.

However, despite the alliances’ practicality, they can also present challenges for a nation like the UAE. Despite the enormous amount of attention and time the UAE spends maintaining its associations, partners usually make foreign policies that conflict with the UAE policies. The same case also happens for other small states. Iran has made a series of decisions that conflicted with the interests of its allies in the region. Regardless of global criticism, it decided to continue developing nuclear weapons. Also, nations in the same alliances can sometimes implement trade policies that negatively affect others.

To best understand this, we look at the informal agreement between the USSR and the US during the Cold War period. Despite open animosity and few treaty commitments, the two superpowers depended on unwritten agreements. The lack of explicit treaty obligations, particularly in vital areas of national security, and the overt animosity between the two superpowers, which frequently cast doubt on the validity of collaboration, were the two primary reasons why informal agreements were so important. One example of these unwritten norms in action is the US choice to pursue containment rather than rollback during the Cold War, an implicit recognition of the other side’s sphere of influence. Even in limited wars worldwide, avoiding direct military engagement demonstrates the effectiveness of these informal arrangements. This strategy was critical as it ensured that the situation did not escalate and is referred to as the unspoken rule.

The informality could be in varying degrees, and these are dependent on two dimensions. One of them would be the government level at which the said agreements are made. The commitments made by heads of state are considered more visible and credible regarding their policy intentions. In smaller matters, the lower-level bureaucracies are often said to be involved. These would be less constraining than when the head of state or other senior leaders agree, mainly because the bureaucrats do not have the same impact or visibility regarding the national reputation. The second dimension is the means by which the agreement is expressed. A written document might be more elaborate, or it could be through a less formal exchange of notes, an oral bargain, or even a tacit bargain. In a formal agreement, the written document is said to provide significant attention to detail regarding the explicit considerations, which makes it required that there are some guarantees that are needed by both countries to be fulfilled, and these restrict the countries or limit their foreign policies to ensure it does not violate the agreement. Conversely, formal agreements, like oral or tacit, are more ambiguous, and there are no clear delimitations. There is also often doubt in making and executing them.

The UAE has recently signed a formal agreement with Israel, while it has a long-existing agreement with the US. Informal agreements or promises have also been made to regional partners and other countries under the OIC based on a coalition. This alliance could be a limiting factor in how the state would like to project. The best example is the agreement with Israel, as it makes it harder to justify or promise anything that would violate the agreement, which limits their influence or powers to a certain extent. Understanding how these alliances limit the country’s ability to achieve a bigger role as a regional power is essential.

3.3.3 Hedging/Bandwagoning

To better understand hedging or bandwagoning, it is critical to explore a context, and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict could be considered one of the vital events that would transform the global political order. Tertiary and secondary players in the global world, especially in the MENA area, are in a special position because of the heightened great power competition. As a result of Russia’s and China’s increasing political and economic might, several Middle Eastern and North African states have figured out how to take advantage of the current quasi-unipolar world order. One important thing to note is that having close relations with many superpowers has been acceptable, which has been a strategic advantage. But these states, particularly in the MENA region, are under increased pressure to clarify their orientation in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is mentioned that the manner or extent to which the states or countries would try to position themselves either with a power or the other is said to be the focus of the alignment context.

States can use a wide variety of methods in a strategic setting to ensure their protection or express their viewpoint or alignment. The phenomenon of states firmly aligning themselves with one big power is known as bandwagoning, and it has been the subject of much analysis. Both avoiding an outside threat and seeking profit maximisation by associating with a state that is viewed as more decisive are possible explanations for this behaviour. Some researchers are said to mention that while jumping on the bandwagon could make you feel safe, the challenge is that you would need to give up some control over sovereignty.

A policy of non-interference in international conflicts or contests between superpowers is an option that states can consider. It is mentioned within the literature that governments can manage to keep in touch with opposing factions while avoiding direct involvement and perhaps even helping to resolve conflicts using this approach. States gain foreign policy leverage by remaining neutral, but they sacrifice superpower protection in the process. For neutrality to be a security-enhancing tool, several conditions must be satisfied. Most importantly, major countries must adhere to the legal and political standards that govern their neutral position. Under relative safety and security conditions, this tactic has a better chance of succeeding. Nevertheless, in the post-bipolar era, many doubt neutrality’s usefulness and feasibility, particularly in light of its widespread use as a rhetorical position.

State actors have more sophisticated options than simple neutrality or bandwagoning, one of which is ‘hedging’. The literature defines this technique as involving three interrelated parts. To begin with, , nations cannot pick a side in the struggle between superpowers; secondly, it comprises acting in a way that is contrary to and even opposite to the interests at odds with one another; and last but not least, it is critical to ensure the use of opposite acts and instruments to ensure and safeguard the gains while also ensuring there is an alternative available. In situations where the results of conflicts or competitions are unpredictable, hedging becomes more of a fine-tuned balancing act. The primary goal is to keep both leverage and security at the same time. States that use hedging instead of aligning with one power transmit good messages for both sides. The strategy maximises economic and political gains while minimising reliance on one actor. It must be understood that the efficacy of hedging depends on how it is carried out. A state’s security situation can deteriorate if its hedging techniques are not executed properly, as they can cause trust to decrease. So, hedging is a tactic that needs to be carefully considered and navigated in the complex world of international relations.

Furthermore, hedging is a common concept in foreign policy. It refers to the behaviour of insurance seeking, with three features: taking no sides, chasing opposite, mutually-counteracting approaches to offset different risks, and cultivating and diversifying a position to fall back. Most nations, including large states, are hedgers. The UAE also employs this foreign policy strategy when dealing with some nations, such as Iran, which it considers a major regional threat. Since the country’s foundation, it has primarily followed a hedging strategy involving soft engagement and complex balancing.

Soft balancing comprises stimulating involvement in multilateral agencies and developing links to international and regional powers to undermine or thwart Iranian policy measures and impede its endeavours to impose regional hegemony. Engagement refers to the country’s confrontation with Iran at social, political, and economic levels, aiming to socialise Iran into behaviour that complies with international laws and convince its leaders to pursue goals and objectives similar to those of normal states. Complex balancing includes the development of military abilities to discourage aggressive Iranian action and develop alliances with regional and major powers, most critically Saudi Arabia and the US, to counterbalance the influence of Iran in the Arab world.

When it comes to the UAE, over the years, the country has been using strategic hedging in its relationship, especially with that of Iran. The strategy’s overarching goal is to reduce potential threats to national security in the long run while simultaneously increasing the economic and political benefits of working with Iran. Notably, avoiding a direct military confrontation with Iran has been achieved by the hedging technique. Over the years, the UAE has maintained national security and eased tensions via its diplomatic and business-first policies. But, following the Arab Spring, the UAE’s foreign policy changed, becoming more active and aggressive in the area. Hard balancing has unintended consequences, most notably angering Tehran. Recent signs may indicate a possible return to the UAE’s preferred hedging policy; however, they are mixed. The country urged diplomacy and prudence in reaction to strikes near the Strait of Hormuz in June 2019 instead of openly blaming Iran.

The UAE has tried to prevent a confrontation with the Iranians. However, after the uprising of 2011, the UAE altered its course and began pursuing complex balancing strategies. It strengthened its partnership with the US against Iran. The UAE has also been concentrating on difficult balancing by increasing its military capabilities. One of the strengths of hedging is that it allows a small country to continue pursuing its foreign interests without engaging in open confrontation with others. The weakness is that it may take years to achieve the intended goals.

Also, reports indicate that meetings between the Iranian and Emirati officials were held prior to the withdrawal of soldiers from Yemen, which is seen as a change from a ‘military-first’ to a ‘peace-first’ plan. A return to hedging as a favoured strategy for dealing with Tehran is indicated by this decision, which is prompted by fears about the developing conflict between the US and Iran. Even in the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the country has made use of balance hedging to ensure that they remain somewhat neutral with support to both sides while exerting their influence to reduce the risk and ensure the conflict is resolved. On the other hand, the Palestine-Israel conflict was more Palestine-leaning, with the country pushing for a ceasefire and trying to ensure peace in the area along with other global actors, which in some situations has been by going against the US and more engagements with Russia. The balanced hedging approach is adopted due to the fear or the limitations the country feels it has, which influences its options on the global stage. There is a need to understand how the national conception leading to hedging influences their ambitions and pursuit of being a regional power or leader.

However, since the bandwagoning approach involves aligning with regional hegemons or the threat, small states primarily depend on this approach to avoid confrontation. As one of the world’s small states with security vulnerabilities, the UAE’s initial decades of foreign relations provide a perfect example of alliances to enhance its power. Under the years of Sheikh Zayed, the nation sought partnerships and friendships with neighbours in the Islamic world and played a part in the policy-making of the Arab world. Foreign policy also began moving towards proactive stances of closer security relationships with the US, primarily through alliances in global interventions in Afghanistan and Bosnia. Bandwagoning in these years helped the nation’s military forces participate in international military operations, thereby improving its global military power. A disadvantage of bandwagoning is that the state foregoes its interests to avoid conflicts.

3.4 Resilience

The concept of resilience, used initially to characterise materials or systems’ capacity to withstand large stresses without breaking, has now spread across many disciplinary areas, . including the social sciences , ecology, and psychology. Still, the absence of a generally acknowledged definition of resilience is noticeable despite several scholars exploring its complex character. Research conducted by the Community and Regional Resilience Institute (2013) mentions that one of the main challenges is associated with the difficulty in choosing one ideal definition for resilience, as there are many to choose from. Each of these is said to have its significance, which is said to allow it to ensure significant contribution when it comes to knowledge domains as well as in interdisciplinary studies. The experts are said to argue that it is critical for this concept definition to be defined in a way it would be used.

Despite the term’s widespread use, a coherent idea of resilience across diverse areas is still challenging. The difference in opinions or thoughts on the definition has been said to result from subjectivity and varied assumptions, which leads to a certain ambiguity. The presence of this ‘blurring’ introduces complexity into the precise interpretation and implementation of resilience, which in turn affects evaluations of its impact on development processes. On the contrary, investigating resilience facilitates intricate thought processes, surpassing prevailing paradigms of knowledge, encouraging novel avenues for discourse and expanding knowledge.

Human actions encompassed in the framework of resilience thinking consist of transformation, which entails the establishment of new pathways, and adaptation, which bolsters existing trajectories. The promise and dynamism of this characteristic emphasise the importance of the resilience concept.

As per the definition provided by an international strategy for disaster reduction, resilience pertains to the capacity of a society, community, or system to withstand, assimilate, adapt, and recuperate from perils while safeguarding critical infrastructure and operations. Researchers propose a capacity-focused approach that places significant emphasis on measurement uncertainty. Regarding the interaction between persistence and transformation, scholars contend that resilience is a constellation of ideas that cannot be reduced to a single theory but can be tested through various practices. Resilience is characterised as a broad, multifaceted complex of concepts. In general, a wide range of research methodologies unites around the fundamental concept of the capacity of complex systems to withstand detrimental effects without compromising their operational integrity. This serves as the basis for examining how the concept of resilience is applied within the realm of national security.

Resilience as a research area emerged in the early 21st century in the realm of national security. Post-World War II, the conventional approach to national security concentrated primarily on the military involvement of the state in external conflicts. Nevertheless, this particular viewpoint encountered censure due to its limited scope and state-centric nature, particularly in light of the ever-evolving security landscape, exemplified by the Soviet Union’s demise and the conclusion of the Cold War. Prominent academics espoused the notion of security emancipation in the early 1990s, advocating for a national security system that was more adaptable. This signified a deviation from the conventional model that centred on the state. In the interim, the securitisation theory significantly influenced the field of security studies. Political, economic, social, and environmental factors were incorporated into this security theory and the conventional military dimension.

There were some who Ullmann (1983) argued in favour of a more comprehensive understanding of national security that extends beyond the mere mitigation of military risks and encompasses non-military hazards as well. From this vantage point, the concept of human security prioritisation was developed. This concept incorporated numerous facets, including economic, dietary, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Particularly with the advent of globalisation, discussions regarding security have broadened beyond the national level to incorporate regional and global perspectives. According to David Held study, the distinction between national and international security strategies has become increasingly indistinct as a result of globalisation. Although the effects of globalisation varied from nation to nation, there was a general trend of institutional constraints diminishing the capacity of nation-states toexercise the use of force in international affairs.. As a result, dialogues arose regarding the need to modify political frameworks on a global and national scale in order to correspond with the ever-changing global landscape.

The discussion on global security has developed, with nation-states, particularly global leaders, broadening their comprehension beyond safeguarding and advancing national interests. This change is defined by a readiness to externally interfere in situations where the protection of human rights is necessary. It is motivated by the rising ideology of the global community regarding the need to prioritise human security. Nevertheless, the actual execution of the idea of powerful nations intervening to safeguard human rights had inherent difficulties, resulting in conflicts with the autonomous rights of sovereign states and placing substantial financial obligations on the intervening nations.

The evolving worldwide security landscape, characterised by emerging and heightened dangers, has necessitated a reassessment of current concepts of security. As a result, it has been acknowledged that national security systems require new attributes to empower states to autonomously address threats and risks of any kind and source. Essentially, there is an increasing focus on developing state resilience as a crucial element in tackling ever-changing security concerns. To understand the changes, it is critical to understand how globalisation has influenced change and developed the need for states to build resilience.

3.4.1 Globalisation and transformation of national security

The conventional notion of national security, derived from the ideas of influential thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber, emphasises that the state has exclusive authority over the lawful application of physical force. In this context, ensuring security is the primary duty of the nation-state. This traditional viewpoint entails establishing a proficient security bureaucracy to oversee both foreign and internal dangers to national security, primarily inside a specific geographical area. Nevertheless, the emergence of security problems, including non-military dangers posed by non-state entities like international terrorism, organised crime, pandemics, and natural disasters, has necessitated a reassessment of the conventional notion of national security. The worldwide scope of these dangers prompts inquiries about the nation-state’s proficiency in dealing with cross-border predicaments.

According to literature, although the state’s involvement in the economy is decreasing, it still plays the most important role in providing security because of its distinct ability to take action and its authority to determine what constitutes security concerns. The literature also elaborates on this, emphasising the government’s increased involvement in dealing with non-conventional threats through securitisation. This entails safeguarding society from acts of aggression, promoting prosperity and social welfare, and upholding fundamental principles and cultural heritage. The Copenhagen school employs the theoretical concepts to underscore the state’s pivotal role in security affairs. Securitization is perceived as a form of communication in which elites portray a problem as a threat to the existence of the collective or nation, , leading to the implementation of exceptional measures designed to thwart the perceived threat. The issue or threat is therefore placed above normal day to day politics, and often presented as an issue of national security. The Copenhagen school of thought delineates the domains of economic, environmental, military, political, and sociological sectors as focal points for security research. It advocates for the process of desecuritization, which entails shifting topics from the realm of security concerns to the realm of regular political discourse. There were other views, and one such was the Paris school, where the argument is made that in addition to the speech act in itself, audience, context and political agency would be critical determinants to see whether the securitisation is effective.

The national security plans of several countries, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US, emphasise the increasing number of emerging security risks and the urgent need for government action. The techniques heavily rely on the perception of vulnerability stemming from global interdependency and the acknowledgement of unpredictability. Britain’s national security plan recognises that open societies and increased global networking contribute to heightened vulnerability. This vulnerability is attributed to threats posed by non-state actors, terrorism, as well as difficulties related to energy, food, water supply, and climate change.

Canada’s national security policy underscores the government’s central responsibility to safeguard citizens in a globally interconnected and intricate environment. The National Security White Paper of Australia delineates objectives that integrate conventional security endeavours with the establishment of national resilience, with a primary focus on protecting the population, enhancing sovereignty, ensuring the safety of assets and infrastructure, and fostering a favourable international atmosphere. The Netherlands implements a comprehensive global security policy to tackle swift worldwide transformations, with a focus on uncertainty and the diminishing boundary between internal and external security.

In light of the numerous dangers and intricate global circumstances, national security policies progressively embrace a risk-oriented strategy that encompasses all potential hazards and involves the entire population. Significantly, the notion of resilience has emerged as a vital component in this new paradigm. Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands have distinct resilience policies, whereas the US government places importance on the resilience and security of critical infrastructure through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). There was a sudden rise in national security declarations and strategies when it comes to the US, and most of the policy and declaration, both in the domestic and international arena, makes resilience a key principle based on which the said strategies are formulated or developed. In 2010, under the Obama Administration, the first National Security Strategy adopted the concept of resilience, a term referred to 36 times in its report and recommendations. As per a researcher, it is mentioned that the strategy construct of resilience is considered a global value and a critical part of the prerequisite of the US National Security Strategy. In the National Security Strategy Report published in 2010, it was mentioned that the country would not be capable of deterring or preventing all threats, which is one of the reasons why the country needs to build its resilience. The report also focuses largely on the increasing threat of terrorism, the chances of natural disasters and pandemics, along with the increasing threats posed by cyber-attacks. The report mentions an increased need or effort to protect the country and its critical infrastructure, along with the role of the private sector that owns and operates most of the critical infrastructure mentioned. When it came to emergency management, the strategy pledged focused on building resilience in all capacities on all levels, from government to citizens, and it claims resilience is at the heart of the culture and spirit of the country.

Since 2011, the National Preparedness Goal of the DHS has included resilience, intending to create a secure and resilient nation with complete community-wide capabilities. This dedication covers a wide range of activities, including safeguarding against, responding to, minimising, and recovering from dangerous dangers. This focus on resilience is maintained in the second version of the 2015 National Preparedness Goal. One of the primary goals outlined in the 2014 DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review is to increase the nation’s capacity to withstand and recover from various emergencies and disasters. This framework addresses explicitly cyber threats and natural disasters.

Furthermore, the paper alludes to the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. In addition, the DHS incorporates resilience into broad strategies and more targeted programs and policies; one example is a practical resilience project, the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program, which the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection oversees. As part of this endeavour, the DHS Office of Health Affairs developed the program. In addition, the STAR program was developed to provide a labelling system for resilient households and essential infrastructure.

Regarding global resilience, the principles have also been guiding principles for the US, which is also evident in the National Security Strategies Reports since 2010 and 2015, which refers to resilience as one of the four principal dimensions. An emphasis on building a robust and healthy global economy has been consistent across the strategy reports. A strong sense of national security, economic competitiveness, resilience, and setting a good example are all emphasised in the 2010 NSS. During his 2015 State of the Union speech, President Obama emphasised the need for a strong and diverse economy to maintain US leadership in combating global health crises, climate change, terrorism, and military aggression. When it comes to the US Armed Forces, the National Security Strategy is found to laud the extraordinary fortitude, flexibility, and inventiveness of the entire volunteer army. Counterterrorism, stability operations, and conflict prevention are just a few things the military gets involved in, and by understanding and recognising the danger of extremism in unstable governments, the NSS lays forth a pledge to collaborate with partners to promote governance, eradicate severe poverty, and boost prosperity.

Terrorism, according to the NSS, is both ever-present and almost borderless; thus, taking preventative measures is crucial. In response to climate change, the country, through its strategy, promises to bolster food security and help the world’s poorest nations become more resilient. The 2015 strategy report goes above and beyond by offering practical resources to mitigate climate change, such as reducing carbon emissions and bolstering sustainable agriculture in underdeveloped nations. The United States has promised to play an active role in global development as an innovator and a direct aid giver, and resilience is a key component of this effort. Congruent with the Millennium Development Goals, the resilience approach established aims to eradicate severe poverty from developing nations across the globe. To promote food security, increase resilience, modernise agriculture, and lessen the vulnerability of people experiencing poverty, the NSS views the scientific, technological, and entrepreneurial strengths of the United States as valuable tools, emphasising sustainability, education, and good governance as prerequisites for development.

In the above example of the US, we are looking at a global power that has had strong control and influence on global politics and has a lot of hard and soft power that it exploits as required and has enforced a belief of the country being the global police. Powerful nations like China and the US can influence international politics, safeguard their interests, and boost their economies through their enormous military might, technological prowess, and soft power. On the other hand, smaller governments like the UAE frequently use alliances to navigate the intricate geopolitical landscape. This strategy involves hedging and jumping on the bandwagon as they aim to align themselves with different policies and power centres in order to strengthen their influence and security. The UAE has realised the need for resilience if it desires to have its own foreign policy and decision-making power, which is not influenced by or bandwagoning the views of its allies or partners. Over the years, countries like Taiwan have developed a strategy that is not focused on balancing between hedging and bandwagoning but one where measures are taken and preferred choices are made based on the need for the time. They say pure balancing is not palatable due to the overall cost and associated risks. This has led them to put aside the sovereignty dispute and use a rapprochement approach with China while at the same time extending a supporting policy to the US, which allows them to counter China’s assertive and aggressive conduct. It is also mentioned that the smaller states are more responsible for conflicts as they are often dissatisfied with their status. When the established powers refuse to see them as equal, provocations rise from these smaller states and rising powers.

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3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we explored the regional security complex to determine the differing roles played by different levels of powers, but the adaptation of nascent RSC was found to be more effective for understanding the current study as it elaborates across three variables which resonate with the situation of the UAE and provides an in-depth understanding and insight into the intricate interactions observed between different players and provides a complete understanding of the country and its priorities.

The chapter also explored the national role conception or identity development, why it is critical, and how it is influenced. The literature highlights that national role conceptions are a set of rules and standards that often govern the reaction or actions of the government, and this is often based on the understanding of the country with regard to its position in the international arena. The literature on the topic covered different aspects and roles played by various factors within the role theory to explain the development of national identity, but the study focuses largely on three main factors that are how small states or small powers perception impacts their view, the hedging or bandwagoning strategy that the country uses, and last but not least the role of alliances.

From the literature, the UAE has been identified as a second category of powers that are critical for major powers and need to be considered when they implement their foreign policies, which means their foreign policies could also be considered to build their resilience. This shift has been seen in foreign policy where the country has signed with Israel, which is considered to be an enemy of the Arab countries, and also improving relations with China, which too highlights adopting measures that they feel are ideal for them due to their importance to the major powers. In addition, we also see the country often making decisions that are not bandwagoning the superpowers and continually trying to undertake strategic hedging with a focus on reducing its national threats, which shows the country to be a highly strategic player in international affairs.

The UAE has significant soft power, which it has used to gain support and is considered friendly and has enough support from many countries due to this, but recent activities have highlighted its capability to shift or adopt hard power tactics often considered to be at the cost of the goodwill the country has created. With the changing vision under the new leadership, the UAE is moving more towards developing hard and soft power strategies while ensuring strategic hedging, balance in relationships and neutrality in intentional relations, and focusing mainly on the country and its security rather than the region as a whole.

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