Case 8.4 – PICCADACI V. TOWn OF STOUgHTOn 2019 wL 653146 (U.s.D.C., D. Mass. 2019)
Background: The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Piccadaci as the nonmoving party, are as follows. In 2002, Piccadaci began working as a seasonal contractor plowing snow for Stoughton. On November 4, 2013, Stoughton hired him as a full-time truck driver and laborer for a probationary period of one year. Throughout his employment, Piccadaci was supervised by Batchelder, the Superintendent of Stough-ton’s Department of Public Works. In January 2014, Batchelder questioned Piccadaci’s carpentry skills. Piccadaci represented himself as a finish carpenter, but neither Batchelder nor Thomas Fitzgerald, the assistant DPW director, considered Piccadaci’s woodworking skills to meet finish carpentry standards. That winter, Batchelder also questioned Piccadaci’s ability to drive a stick-shift truck, even though he had a Class A CDL license. Piccadaci interpreted Batchelder’s criticisms as verbal attacks. On August 2, 2014, Piccadaci began experiencing stom-ach pains, but he continued to work. On August 18, 2014, he presented to Dr. Louis Silvagnoli, Jr., who opined that he could return to work. On August 26, 2014, he sought a second opinion from Dr. Syed Imam, who advised him not to return to work that week. The doctors’ notes, which were provided to Fitzgerald, did not mention a disability or request an accommodation.
During the year, Fitzgerald heard from several foremen that they were not pleased with Piccadaci’s performance. They characterized him as lazy, unreliable, and difficult to work with. In particular, Piccadaci was criticized for failing to respond to four out of six overtime sanding requests that winter. Fitzger-ald spoke with Batchelder about the foremen’s concerns and recommended that Piccadaci be terminated. At the end of August, Batchelder informed Piccadaci that he would be fired. On August 27, 2014, Michael Hartman, Stoughton’s Town Manager, formally notified Piccadaci of his termination. On June 4, 2015, Piccadaci filed a charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, alleging that Stoughton and Batchelder had wrongfully terminated him. After the MCAD found a lack of probable cause on March 31, 2017, Piccadaci initiated this lawsuit in Norfolk Superior Court on August 11, 2017. Defendants then removed the case to this court on January 31, 2018.
Discussion: Summary judgment is appropriate when, based on the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A material fact is one that has the “potential to affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law.” For a dispute to be “genuine,” the “evidence relevant to the issue, viewed in the light most flattering to the party opposing the motion, must be sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either side. Even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”
Race Discrimination
To make out a prima facie case of race discrimination under Massachusetts law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Piccadaci must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (4) there is evidence of a causal connection between his membership in the protected class and the adverse employ-ment action. Piccadaci fails on at least the fourth element of his prima facie case. Piccadaci’s claim is based on a single incident in July 2014,
when Batchelder remarked that an African American worker
was playing “the black card.” Piccadaci was offended by the remark because the worker was a friend of his, and because he was then engaged to a black woman ofIndian and Cape Verdean descent. He also argues that, as “a self-identified dark-skinned,
Sicilian/Italian,” he “felt prejudiced by [Batchelder’s] racial comments.” Piccadaci, however, offers no evidence that defendants considered race when deciding to terminate him. The isolated remark attributed to Batchelder is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, let alone to withstand summary judgment.
Harassment
Piccadaci’s “harassment” claim is, in essence, a hostile work environment claim. To prevail on this claim, Piccadaci must establish that he worked in an environment so hostile as to unreasonably interfere with his ability to perform his work. The hostile conduct alleged must have been severe and pervasive and would have been perceived as such by a reasonable person. Piccadaci alleges that Batchelder harassed him based on
his “fiancé’s race and national origin, [his] age, gender and/ or handicap.” Piccadaci alludes to “a pattern of harassment” based on Batchelder’s questioning of his carpentry and driv-ing skills, as well as Batchelder’s calling him and another employee “assholes.” Even accepting these allegations as true, they do not amount to an environment “ ‘pervaded by harass-ment or abuse.’ ”
Retaliation
To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Massachusetts law, Piccadaci must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to his protected activity. Piccadaci stumbles here over the first element of his prima facie case because he does not identify a protected activity. While the protected activity element may be satisfied by
a plaintiff’s opposition to what is reasonably perceived as a discriminatory employment practice, the most that Piccadaci alleges is that Batchelder would not personally accept his doctor’s note. Even if the tendering of the note could be considered a petitioning activity of some sort, the medical note in question flagged no issue that might conceivably have incited an urge for discriminatory retaliation. It did not mention Piccadaci’s disability, nor did it request an accommodation. Piccadaci’s retaliation claim, therefore, fails as a matter of law.
Wrongful Termination
Piccadaci alleges that “Stoughton wrongfully terminated [him] by not allowing him to present a disability note and by denying him use of sick/vacation time or the Family Medical Leave Act or equivalent Massachusetts law.” The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to 12 work weeks of leave that may be taken intermittently for “a serious health condition.” To establish entitlement, Piccadaci must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he was an “eligible employee”; (2) Stoughton is a “covered employer”; (3) he gave adequate notice of his request for the protected leave; and (4) the leave was necessitated by reasons covered by the FMLA. Even assuming that he was an eligible employee, Piccadaci did not notify Stoughton of any request for an FMLA leave, hence his prima facie case collapses. For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for sum-mary judgment is allowed. The Clerk will enter judgment for defendants and close the case.
Case Questions
1. On what basis was the employee allegedly being harassed? What evidence supports his claim that the harassment was based on national origin and religion?
2. What is an employer’s obligation under Title VII to prevent workplace harassment based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion? What had the employer done in this case to stop the harassment?
3. Do you agree with the district court’s decision? Explain why or why not.
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